Opting out of EU police and justice co-operation may be an‘own goal’ for David Cameron by Brady, Hugo
blo gs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/09/eu-uk-po lice-justice-opt-out/
Euro p e an Co urt o f Justice , Luxe mb o urg  Cre d it: Gwe nae l
Piase r (Cre ative  Co mmo ns BY-NC-SA)
Opting out of EU police and justice co-operation may be an
‘own goal’ for David Cameron
by Blog Admin
After 2014 the European Court of Justice will be given new powers over how police,
prosecutors and courts across the EU co-operate. The UK Prime Minister David Cameron
recently announced that this will be used as an opportunity for the country to opt-out of a raft
of these cooperation agreements. Hugo Brady argues that the UK’s strategy of opting out of
the full package of agreements, with the intention of opting back in to measures it agrees with,
is wrong-headed  unlikely to succeed and could leave the country with much diminished
influence.
Britain has a decision to make with implications both f or its security and inf luence within the EU. Should the
Conservative-Liberal democrat coalit ion withdraw f rom most EU co-operation on crime and policing by
2014? It can do so thanks to a special deal won by Britain in negotiations over the EU’s Lisbon treaty in
2009. As things stand, MPs look likely to say ‘yay’ when parliament votes on the matter next year: anti-EU
f eeling is running high in Westminster,
If  Britain exercises this ‘block opt-out’, the UK will lose access to a raf t of  cross-border agreements and
databases designed to help EU countries maintain security and better manage the f ree f low of  people
between them. Crucially, Britain’s authorit ies will no longer be able to use the European arrest warrant
(EAW) with which they have prosecuted hundreds of  murders, bank robberies, drug of f ences and other
kinds of  crime that would otherwise have gone unpunished.
The UK f ears the impact of  new powers given to the
European Court of  Justice (ECJ) over how police,
prosecutors and courts across the EU co-operate to
investigate crime, organise extradit ions, share criminal
records and exchange evidence. Af ter 2014, the
European Commission will be able to enf orce over
130 such agreements and EU judges interpret their
exact meaning, as they do with single market
regulation.
Most EU countries have criminal justice systems
based on a mix of  the Roman civil law and the
Napoleonic legal code. Of  the large member-states,
only Britain uses common law, a f undamentally
dif f erent system, where the def ence and prosecution
argue cases bef ore a neutral judge and jury. Other governments recognise that Britain (and Ireland, another
common law country) are unique in this respect. Consequently, both can opt- in to EU crime and policing
measures on a case-by-case basis.
But Lisbon has shif ted the emphasis of  EU criminal justice policy away f rom ‘co-operation’ towards more
‘integration’. Over t ime – the thinking in Whitehall goes – EU judges might undermine Britain’s common law in
f avour of  the continental civil model by handing down harmonising rulings. This, along a domestic polit ical
backlash against the inf luence of  European courts, makes it likely that Britain’s prime minister, David
Cameron, will use the block opt-out.
That would be a mistake. First, UK of f icials think that Britain’s size and importance mean that it can
automatically opt back in to around 50 EU anti-crime measures, including the arrest warrant, once the block
opt-out is triggered. That way the government could secure access to co-operation and data valued by
Britain’s police while limiting the country’s exposure to f uture ECJ rulings. This is wrongheaded. The
European Commission is likely to attach tough conditions to allow this and Britain’s negotiating stock in
Brussels is low due to its perceived unhelpf ulness during the eurozone crisis.
Furthermore, countries in the EU’s Schengen area of  passport- f ree travel have previously blocked Britain
f rom joining Frontex, the EU’s border agency, and the so-called VIS, a common database of  visa records.
(The UK maintains its own separate border regime.) Why should they now acquiesce to Brit ish cherry-
picking in policing and justice?
Second, Britain has shaped much of  the EU’s internal security agenda to date. The current head of  Europol
(the EU’s police of f ice) Rob Wainwright, is Brit ish; as have been the last two presidents of  Eurojust (its
prosecution of f ice), and the last two director-generals of  the Commission’s justice and home af f airs
directorate. For a country that is not in Schengen, possesses a minority legal system and selectively opts-
out of  common rules, this is a remarkable diplomatic success.
But this inf luence would be badly diminished were Britain to leave most co-operation in this area. Other
countries are largely unaware of  the f orgotten opt-out and its likely use. Eurosceptics see the opt-out as a
step towards their goal to move Britain to the f ringes of  the EU. Even tradit ional allies like the Netherlands
and Sweden are likely to be annoyed.
If  Britain’s ruse to escape ECJ jurisdiction backf ires, then its government must apply EU f ree movement
rules regardless. These are part of  the single market: the basis under which millions of  EU nationals live in
the UK. However, Britain’s public authorit ies would be f ar less able to co-operate with other EU countries
on extradit ion and basic security questions. Stephen Lander, a f ormer head of  Britain’s internal intelligence
service, underlined this risk in a recent letter to government, co-signed by several f ormer UK police chief s.
Hence Cameron must choose: either f ace down the eurosceptics or risk f uture enquiries as to why Britain
deliberately weakened its co-operation with other EU countries on issues like organised crime and terrorism
on his watch.
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